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Proportional Pragmatism: A Defense
of International Arbitration
Agreements in the Face of
Asymmetrical Paternalism

Rusty O'Kane*

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is generally perceived to have a
positive impact on the economic well being of developing countries.' In
particular, international investors provide developing regions of the world
with access to capital, job opportunities, and new technologies. 2 With
FDI's increasingly important role in the global market, a more
comprehensive regulatory system has emerged to guide key participants.'
Bilateral investment treaties have developed as an essential piece of
the emerging regulatory system. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are
"[international investment] agreements between two countries for the
reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank my
friends and family for their support and the members of the Northwestern Journal of
International Law and Business for their excellent editorial assistance.
' See NOAH RUBINS & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT, POLInCAL
RISK AND DISPUTE SETTLEMENT xxviii-xxix (2005) (discussing the benefits FDI brings to
both the investors and host states while further pointing out the positive effect of FDI on the
economy of developing countries).
2 Viji Rangaswami, Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Statement at the Carnegie
Endowment Workshop on Globalization, International Law, and the Future of International
Investment Treaties (July 15, 2005) (summarized by Jennifer Maul and Kate Vyborny),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/IISD.pdf, see Karl P. Sauvant, The Rise of
International Investment, Investment Agreements and Investment Disputes, in APPEALS
MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 3 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008)

(mentioning FDI as a means to bring goods and services to foreign markets).
3 1 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

AGREEMENTS: KEY ISSUES at xxi, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/113/IIT/2004/10 (2004) [hereinafter
KEY ISSUES] (noting that the first half of the 21st century will feature an establishment of an
international investment law system).
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other's territories by companies based in either country."4 BITS have
greatly proliferated in the last two decades and are playing a significant role
in investment protection. Their number rose from 385 in 1989 to a total of
2,265 in 2003.6 By mid-2008, more than 2,619 BITs involving 179
different countries had been ratified or renegotiated.
These treaties have drastically affected the way foreign investors
interact with host countries, especially in the area of dispute resolution.8 A
distinctive feature of many BITs is that they provide for alternative dispute
resolution procedures such as international arbitration.9 International
investment arbitration agreements, authorized by BITs, provide guarantees
to the investors of one contracting state when they invest in the territory of
the other contracting state.'o These guarantees include fair and equitable
In
treatment, protection from expropriation, and security for assets."
particular, an investor whose rights are violated by a host country may,
under the terms of these treaties, pursue international arbitration rather than
suing the host State in its domestic courts.12 International arbitration is
advantageous because of "its cross-border enforceability-in other words,
an award rendered in one country can be taken, with relative ease, to
another country and enforced against the assets of a judgment creditor
there."' 3
Numerous concerns have been raised, however, that developing
countries are sacrificing too much sovereignty in order to attract FDI and
that arbiters are beginning to act more like legislators than neutral decision-

4 UNCTAD,
Investment
Instruments
Online:
1006.aspx (last
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page
[hereinafter Investment Instruments Online].

What
are
BITs?,
visited Sept. 19, 2009)

RUBINs & KINSELLA, supra note 1, at 27-28.
6 UNCTAD, Recent Developments in InternationalInvestment Agreements: IIA Monitor,

2, 6 (2008), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia2008len.pdf [hereinafter Recent
Developments].
7 Id.
Sauvant, supra note 2, at 7, 9.
9 Jarrod Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties: Of Breaches of
Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and Developed Countries
in ForeignInvestment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135, 142 (2006).
10 Investment Instruments Online, supra note 4.
" RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 1, at 28; see also AARON COSBEY, INT'L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. [IISD], INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 22 (2005),
http://www.iisd.org/pdfl2005/investment iias.pdf (explaining that many International
Investment Agreements extend definitions of protected investment-related assets to

intellectual property rights with protections from expropriation and rights of fair
compensation).
12 Id.

13Mark Beeley, Arbitration in the Dubai International FinancialCentre: A Promising
Law, but Will it Travel Well?, 1 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009).
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makers. 14 Especially troubling for critics is that developing countries are
signing onto bilateral investment treaties that provide numerous rights to
foreign investors without any guarantees that the treaty will generate prodevelopment investment." One critic suggested that instead of fostering
mutually beneficial reciprocal arrangements, the current system of
investment agreements simply allows foreign investors to take advantage of
developing countries.' 6 As a result, there have been widespread calls for
reform or dissolution of the current system in favor of a more uniform
approach that would incorporate mandatory development objectives.17
It is not surprising that in response to the relatively young investment
agreement system, there has been a plethora of critiques leveled against it.
These critiques are commendable insofar as they point out the system's
deficiencies and encourage participants to identify and implement
improvements. Nevertheless, such critiques can be perilous when they lose
sight of the historical background from which the system arose and the
progress that has been made in the last decade.
Many calls for reform exaggerate the treaties' flaws and ignore the
benefits that arbitration provisions provide for developing countries.
Arbitration provides a neutral and competent decision maker to govern
disputes, reduces costs of litigation, and provides faster resolution to
investment disputes.' 8 Together, these advantages create incentives that
promote greater FDI in developing countries, which fosters greater

14See M. Somarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in InternationalInvestment
Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 39, 40 (Karl

P. Sauvant ed., 2008) (suggesting some adverse effect is caused by the increasing number of
arbitration awards against developing countries); Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID
Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 179, 215 (2005) (intrusion into state
sovereignty resulting in a significant transfer of control away from States to appointed
arbiters); Barton Legum, The Introduction of an Appellate Mechanism: The U.S. Trade Act
of 2002, in ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds.,
2004); Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 333,
336 (1999) (dispute resolution viewed as not just a mechanism for neutral application of
legislated rules, but as a mechanism of legislation and of governance).
15Sornarajah, supra note 14, at 39.
16 M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 258 (2d ed. 2004); see

also Somarajah,supra note 14 (explaining that the procedures for challenging awards are not
suitable for developing country respondents because they would add to the costs of
developing countries in dealing with such arbitrations).
'7

HOWARD MANN

ET AL.,

IISD, IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL

AGREEMENT

ON

INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT v (2005) [hereinafter MODEL AGREEMENT];

Prakash Loungani & Assaf Razin, How Beneficial Is Foreign Direct Investment for
available at
FIN.
& DEV.,
June
2001,
Developing
Countries?, 38
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/06/loungani.htm.
18Peter Sherwin et al., Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Arbitration, in
PROSKAUER ON INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION ch. 19, Part I (2007),

availableat http://www.proskauerguide.com/arbitration/19/I.
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economic development.' 9
Countries that heed overly zealous criticism and disavow international
investment arbitration agreements risk removing the protections and
incentives that attract foreign investment. 20 This is not to imply that reform
is not necessary; any effective dispute resolution system must evolve with
experience. However, critics are ignoring the fact that by establishing
greater certainty and security for investors, the arbitration procedures
currently in place have encouraged foreign investment and promoted
economic development in developing countries.21
International investment arbitration agreements have been attacked and
22
defended since their proliferation began almost two decades ago.
However, the system's defenders have thus far only focused on the
inadequacy of specific alternatives or attacked specific proposals.2 3 There
has yet to be an argument that the autonomy provided by the current system
allows developing countries to respond to any perceived disadvantages and
adequately protect their own interests. This comment counters the notion
that investment arbitration agreements provide too few protections for
developing countries in arbitration proceedings.
This comment is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the growth of
international investment agreements ("IIAs") with emphasis on arbitration
clauses. Part II describes specific criticisms leveled against the arbitration
system and describes how the United Nations' revised Model International
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development ("Model
Agreement") is a manifestation of those criticisms. Part III defends the
current investment treaty arbitration system by first debunking the
criticisms leveled against it and then describing how the current system
gives developing countries sufficient autonomy to protect their own
interests without the need for intervention. Finally, Part IV concludes that
while any system must necessarily be reformed as it evolves with
experience, calls for the dissolution of arbitration agreements are overstated
and seek to throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater.

19Id.; see also RUBINs & KINSELLA, supra note 1, at xxviii ("FDI is a potential engine for
development, as the foreigner employs and trains local personnel, indirectly encourages
secondary service providers and producers of goods, pays taxes, and in some case [sic],
leaves behind valuable know-how.").
20 Sauvant, supra note 2, at 6-7.
21 Id.

22 MODEL AGREEMENT, supra note 17, at v.

23 See Daniel S. Meyers, In Defense of the International Treaty Arbitration System, 31
Hous. J. INT'L L. 47, 67-80 (2008) (specifically attacking Gus Van Harten's criticisms that
the ITA system lacks accountability, openness, coherence, and independence); see also
Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:PrivatizingPublic
International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1521 (2005)
(arguing that criticisms of bias and unaccountability are without merit).
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I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Understanding the emergence of international investment arbitration
agreements is crucial to a proper defense of the current system. Foreign
investment is nothing new, and neither are foreign investment disputes.
Traditionally, an investor whose investment was harmed by the host state
lacked standing under international law to bring a direct claim against the
host state.25
Investors only had two options, both of which were
unattractive. The investor could, first, assert a claim in the domestic courts
of the host state.26 Second, barring remedies from the host state, the
investor could appeal to its own government to negotiate with the host state
on the investor's behalf as a matter of diplomatic protection.27
However, there were several problems with these remedies. First,
domestic courts in host countries were "notoriously unsym athetic to
foreign investors' claims" and provided little, if any, redress.
Second,
diplomatic action was not an effective means of protecting investment
interests because the investors' home government would rarely accede to a
request for assistance. When it did, the outcome of the dispute could be
protracted for several years with no guarantee of success.
Therefore,
"prospective foreign investors knew, prior to investing abroad, that if their
investments were subsequently injured by host states, there would be no
reliable or efficient mechanism to obtain compensation.",30
The lack of a reliable and efficient mechanism to resolve disputes not
surprisingly caused fear in the international community that investors would
be discouraged from investing abroad.3 1 One commentator suggested that
"prudent investors will not risk substantial capital in a foreign enterprise
unless the . .. legal structure is sufficient to protect the investment."3 2 This
fear was troublesome because of the positive impact that foreign investment
has on developing countries.33 Specifically, it can help alleviate poverty
and
promote
economic
opportunities
through
increases
in
telecommunications capacitl, the construction of roads, and the
development of power plants.
24
25
26

R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT
Id. at 2.
KEY ISSUES, supra note 3, at 348.

DISPUTEs

2-3 (2005).

27 Id.
28 BISHOP, supra note 24, at
3.
29 ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIC LAw 397 (2d
ed. 2008).

30 Meyers, supra note 23, at 53.

31 COSBEY, supra note 11, at
12.

32 BISHOP, supra note 24, at 7-8.

n Susan D. Franck, IntegratingInvestment Treaty Conflict and Dispute Systems Design,
92 MINN. L. REV. 161, 169 (2007).
34 Id.; see also Jeswald W. Salacuse, Towards a Global Treaty on Foreign Investment:
The Searchfor a GrandBargain, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 51, 56-57

(Norbert Horn ed., 2004) (Germany lost all foreign investment after its defeat in World War
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To allay concerns that foreign investors were limiting their capital
expenditures because of instability involved with investing abroad, many
countries began entering into treaties that provided for a system of
independent arbiters to resolve disputes and secure investments.35 The most
well known treaty is the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 ("New York
Convention"), which has been signed by 144 countries since it was ratified
in 1958.36
The New York Convention is the foundation for the entire
international arbitration system.3 The treaty adopted by the Convention
serves two significant purposes. 8 The treaty first requires recognition and
enforcement of arbitration awards entered in foreign states, thus giving the
awards power across national borders. 39 Second, unless the agreement is
"null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed," domestic
courts in signatory states must recognize and enforce arbitration
agreements. 40
The next major step in the development of international investment
protection came in 1966 when signatories to the Washington Convention
created the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
("ICSID").4 ' The ICSID is an "autonomous international institution" that
"provides facilities for conciliation and arbitration of international
investment disputes." 42 The Washington Convention, also ratified by over
140 countries, created the ICSID as an impartial forum to resolve legal
disputes and remove impediments to private investment posed by "the
absence of specialized international methods for investment dispute
settlement."43 In fact, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD") reported that together, these two international
investment agreements "constitute 'the most important protection of
II, but became the leader in BITs by 1997 and has since improved its economy and increased
its foreign investment).
3s Sherwin, supra note 18, at ch.19, Part I (explaining that the success of international
arbitration can be explained by several major advantages it offers in comparison with
litigation, especially litigation in foreign courts).
36 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 3 (2007).

37Id.
3 Sherwin, supra note 18, at ch.19, Part IV.
3 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10,
at
available
38,
U.N.T.S.
330
2517,
U.S.T.
21
1958,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/XXIIlle.pdf
40 Sherwin, supra note 18, at ch.19, Part IV.
41 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, About ICSID,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHo
me&pageName=AboutICSID Home (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
42

id.

43 Id.
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international foreign investment' to date.""
II. SYSTEM UNDER ATTACK
Despite the widely accepted notion that international investment
arbitration agreements promote stability and encourage foreign
investment, some critics have suggested that the treaty system needs
significant reform, if not complete dissolution.46
One prominent critic, Professor M. Sornarajah from the National
University of Singapore, attacks the current regime for operating under the
"false assumption ... that a system of international investment arbitration
would significantly increase the inflow of capital to developing countries,
bringing with it wealth and development to some of the world's poorest
citizens." 47 Further, the United Nations' revised Model Agreement notes,
"[m]any observers ... around the world believe that the current
international investment regime is so inherently flawed as to be beyond
repair or reform. They argue for the complete dissolution of the regime,
and for the construction of an alternative regime specifically focused on the
obligations of transnational actors."48
Although there have been many criticisms leveled against the current
implementation of BITs and arbitration agreements, only the criticism that
developing countries are vulnerable to the disadvantages of the arbitration
process is addressed here. Specifically, some critics have argued that
developing countries are being taken advantage of by developed countries
through forced acceptance of arbitration agreements that infringe on their

44 NEIL SORENSEN, INST. FOR AGRIC.

AND

DISPUTES

& TRADE

POLICY, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES

(2001),

available

at

http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?reflD=2485 1.
45 See On the BilateralInvestment Treaty with Rwanda: Hearing on Treaty Doc. 110-23
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 11Ith Cong. (Nov. 10, 2009) (testimony of
Wesley S. Scholz, Director, Office of Inv. Affairs, Dep't of State) [hereinafter Scholz
Testimony] ("Foreign investment is an important source of economic growth in the United
States and around the globe."); see also Lisa E. Sachs & Karl P. Sauvant, BITs, DTTs, and
FDI Flows: An Overview, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT FLOWS,

xxvii, xxviii-xxxi (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009).
46 MODEL AGREEMENT, supra note 17, at v; see also Tolga Yalkin, International

Investment Arbitration:Poisonedat the Root?, EUR. J. INT'L L., June 24, 2009, available at
http://www.ejiltalk.org/international-investment-arbitration-poisoned-at-the-root/ (discussing
the 2009 Annual Conference of The British Institute of International and Comparative Law
("BIICL")).
47 MODEL AGREEMENT, supra note 17, at v.
4I HOWARD
INVESTMENT

MANN

FOR

ET AL.,

SUSTAINABLE

IISD,

IISD

MODEL INTERNATIONAL

DEVELOPMENT:

NEGOTIATOR'S

AGREEMENT

HANDBOOK

x

ON
(2006)

[hereinafter NEGOTIATOR'S HANDBOOK], available at

http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investmentmodelint_handbook.pdf
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sovereignty. 49 As one critic has noted, many international investors took
advantage of BITs even when the investor's home country was not party to
the agreement.50 For example, Bechtel, a U.S. corporation, used the
Bolivia-Netherlands BIT to bring actions against Bolivia. 5' Another
example involved General Electric, which used the India-Mauritius BIT and
the India-Netherlands BIT to bring actions against India.52
The concern that investors can "take advantage" of developing
countries is allegedly compounded both because arbiters are biased in favor
In fact, the
of western investors and the system lacks accountability."
stated objective of the United Nations' Model Agreement is "to promote
foreign investment that supports sustainable development, in particular in
developing and least-developed countries." 54
One critic has gone so far as to suggest that "[i]nvestment treaties have
increasingly been concluded . .. as a way to ensure the security of foreign
direct investments generally, but ... [they] reflect neither the interests of
developing countries nor the greater democratization of international
institutions."5 Critics assert that as a result of these flaws, the arbitration
process cannot provide a legitimate dispute resolution mechanism and
56
should be drastically overhauled if not completely dissolved.
A. Vulnerability of Developing Countries
In 2006, Pakistan's then Attorney General, Makhdoom Khan, told a
group of investment arbitration specialists that the treaties were "viewed as
'photo-op agreements'-something that governments would sign with
visiting foreip dignitaries so as to provide an excuse for a photo
opportunity."5 This sentiment was echoed at a recent Harvard Law School

49 Goh Chien Yen, The Sharp Edge of International Investment Agreements:
Expropriationand Dispute Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: ISSUES
AND PERSPECTIVES 1, 1-2 (P. Satyanarayana Prasad ed., 2007), available at
2

http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/Singapore%2Issues/Investmnent/The%2OSharp% 0E
dge%20of/o20ntemational%20Investment%20Agreements%20GohChienYen.doc;
Sornarajah, supra note 14, at 39-40.
so Goh Chien Yen, Expropriation and Investor-State Disputes: The Dangers of
International Investment Agreements, THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE,

Oct.-Nov.

2005,

available at
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/resurgence/1 82-183/CoverO4.doc.
51 Id.
52 Id.

5 Samrat Ganguly, Note, The Investor-State Dispute Mechanism (ISDM) and a
Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 113, 123 (1999).
54 NEGOTIATOR'S HANDBOOK, supra note 48, at 4.
5 SORENSEN, supra note 44.
56 d

5 Luke Peterson, Out of Order, FDI MAGAZINE, Oct. 7, 2008, available at
http://www.fdimagazine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/2575/Out-oforder.html.
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conference that explored the backlash against investment arbitration.18 One
of the panelists, Detlev Vagts, 9 observed that these treaties might be
providing greater protection to foreign investors than the countries that
signed on initially expected. 0
Another criticism leveled against investment agreements concerns the
disparity in power between the contracting parties involved in bilateral
investment treaties. 6 1 For example, in a letter to the U.S. Senate regarding
the U.S.-Uzbekistan BIT, President Clinton wrote that the agreement
creates "conditions more favorable for U.S. private investment" and is
designed to "protect U.S. investment." 62 Additionally, the Director of the
Office of Investment Affairs at the U.S. State Department stated that,
"BITs ... establish rules that protect the rights of U.S. investors abroad and
provide market access for future U.S. investment."63 Together, these
statements arguably reinforce the notion that investment agreements serve
primarily the interests of western nations and corporations at the expense of
the developing world.
Specifically, there is concern that disparity of power leads to broad
arbitration agreements that infringe on state sovereignty and restrict the host
country's ability to regulate its economy. 64 A recent example involves the
Canadian 6overnment's ban on the residential use of weed-killing
chemicals. 6 Dow Agrosciences, a company based in the United States that
produces the chemical, brought suit against Canada seeking compensation
for lost business opportunities as a result of what it believes are government
expropriations prohibited by the treaty.6 6 Critics argue that this is an
example of how foreign investors can unfairly invoke legal provisions to
resist health or environmental regulations and inhibit the host country's
ss Id. (referring to Harvard University School of Law International Law Society
Conference: The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration (April 19, 2008)).
59 Bemis Professor of International Law, Emeritus, Harvard University School of Law.
60 Peterson, supranote 57.
61 Stefan D Amarasinha & Juliane Kokott, Multilateral Investment Rules Revisited, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 120 (Peter Muchlinski,

Federico Ortiflo & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).
62 SORENSEN, supra note 44.
63 Scholz Testimony, supra note 45.

64 See Peterson, supra note 57 (describing the current debate on whether bilateral
investment protection treaties show sufficient deference to governments); see also Jan
Paulson, Avoiding Unintended Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISMS IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 246-51 (Karl P Sauvant ed., 2008) (noting the broad variability in

awards and decisions which has led some nations to question why they must justify their
own actions).
65 Luke Peterson, U.S. Chemical Company Challenges Pesticide Ban, EMBASSY
MAGAZINE, Oct. 22, 2008, available at http://www.pdamerica.orglarticles/news/2008-10-2410-52-52-news.php (the case is still pending and it is yet to be seen whether the arbiters will
actually rule against Canada).
66 Id.
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ability to promote its national interests.67
In 2006, the United Nations issued a report providing guidelines and
suggestions for developing countries. The report suggests that developing
countries "need to establish and maintain policy coherence in the face of a
large number of interacting HAs." 68 The report continues by stating that,
"developing countries need to ensure that they have sufficient capacity to
analyze the scope of obligations into which they are entering when they
conclude an IIA." 69 Particularly noteworthy is the UN's assessment that
developing countries "need to improve their capacities to understand" the
implications of the commitments contained in IIAs.
B. Bias
Developing countries are allegedly susceptible to unfavorable rulings
because of an apparent bias inherent in the forum for arbitration, the
ICSID.7 1 The structure of the ICSID has raised concerns because it
supposedly has a "proclivity [to] place a heavy emphasis on investor
protection above other considerations." 72
Another shortcoming of investment agreements, according to critics, is
that while a majority of the arbiters who decide cases are from
industrialized countries, most of the defendants are developing countries. 73
A report by the Institute of Policy Studies found that "of the 300 judges
who are looking into 111 pending cases at the ICSID, only 63 came from
developing nations." 74 The three-member tribunal was comprised entirely
of arbiters from developing nations in only one case.
Moreover, the lack of tenure of arbiters compounds this inherent bias
by allegedly providing an incentive to interpret treaties in ways that

67 See Paulson, supranote 64, at 251; see also Peterson,supra note 57.
68UNCTAD, Geneva, Switz., Systematic Issues in InternationalInvestment Agreements
(IIAs), at 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIA/2006/2 (Mar. 21, 2006), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webiteiia20062_en.pdf.
69 Id.

at 6.

70 Id.
71 Gus VAN HARTEN,

INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 152-56

(2007) (arguing that the use of private judges to resolve investment treaty issues without
supervision by public judges limits the possibility for judicial review of these decisions and
undermines the accountability of the system); see Emad Mekay, Bias Seen In International
Dispute

Arbiters,

INTER

PRESS

SERVICE,

June

19,

2007,

http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=38229 (citing the lack of success by governments in
ICSID tribunals and suspicions of favoritism in favor of private investors as criticisms of the
ICSID's independence); see also Chien Yen, supra note 49.
72Chien Yen, supra note 50.
73 Mekay, supra note 71.
74 Id.

7 Id.
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advance the arbiters' own careers and the arbitration industry.7 6 Arbiters
are often practicing lawyers, which means that they are in a position to
make full legal rulings that could help clients they represent in other
matters.n Finally, critics contend that there is too little oversight of arbitral
tribunals, which undermines the checks and balances that are essential to
any legitimate system of dispute resolution. 78
One prominent critic of arbitration clauses, Gus Van Harten, argues
that bias toward investors also arises from the fact that investors are the
ones who initiate claims. 7 9 In other words, arbitration proceedings are only
initiated when an investor feels the host country has harmed his interests. If
investors stopped bringing claims, he argues, arbiters would be out of a job.
Therefore, they have an interest in creating a favorable environment for
investors' claims so that more claims are filed and more arbitration
contracts are awarded.o
One proposed solution is to establish a uniform J udicial body that
would theoretically correct the bias in arbitration panels. Reformers claim
that judges would be independent from branches of government, special
interest groups, and other inappropriate influences, and would bring
increased legitimacy to the current system of dispute resolution.82 Job
security-regardless of decisions made from the bench-insulates judges
from the temptation to further his or her career by interpreting the law in
ways that will appease special interests.8
C. Expropriation
Another major criticism is that BITs define impermissible
"expropriation" too broadly.84 Traditionally, international law defined
expropriation as the physical dispossession of the property of the foreign
investor by the state.
However, "what constitutes an act of taking of
foreign property in international law now has come to be befuddled with
difficulty." 6 Recent lawsuits, like the one facing Canada, have confirmed
some critics' belief that foreign investors will use the treaty provisions on
regulatory takings and compensation as "insurance against many risks the
firms would otherwise have assumed themselves as part of the normal
76 Peterson, supra note 57.

77 Id.
78 Id.

7 VAN HARTEN, supranote 71, at 152-53.
Id. at 153.

80

81 Id.
82 Id. at 10.

1 Id. at 152.

84 See Chien Yen, supra note 50; see also Peterson, supra note 57.
85 Chien Yen, supra note 50.
86 Id.
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process of establishing and running a business."
The inclusion of "regulatory takings" in the definition of expropriation
in investment agreements seems to be at the heart of the issue. Supposedly,
this inclusion means that "government measures, policies and state laws
that affect foreign investment could potentially be regarded as
88
Another example is
expropriation," as the case in Canada demonstrates.
the Metalclad case,89 where the tribunal found that "expropriation under
NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of
property ... but also covert or incidental interference with the use of
property which has the effect of depriving the owner ... of the use or
reasonably expected economic benefit of property." 90 This expansive
definition, critics argue, limits foreign countries' sovereign ability to govern
effectively and forces them to "defend ... every policy and regulation
which affects foreign investment against charges of illegal expropriation or
indirect taking."91
Therefore, critics would limit the definition of
expropriation found in investment agreements and restrict investors' rights
to seek damages even if a country's regulatory actions hurt their
investment.92
D. Model Investment Agreement for Sustainable Development
The United Nations' proposed Model Agreement addresses the
concerns raised by critics but still falls short of creating a better system than
the one currently in place. In two critical areas, the Model Agreement goes
beyond mere reform and essentially dissolves the current system.
First, the drafters of the Model Agreement accepted critics' argument
that developing countries need more flexibility to expropriate investors'
assets without any obligation to compensate the investors.93 The Model
Agreement goes even further by stating that "a regulation that takes title to
property would not fall under the indirect expropriation formulation,"
meaning that no claim may be filed. 9 4 Second, by creating a "governing
body" called the Conference of the Parties, the Model Agreement
87

Id.

88 Id.

89 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1,
Award
at
available
2000),
30,
(Aug.
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc
&docld=DC542_En&caseld=C155.

90 Id. para. 103; LOWENFELD, supra note 29, at 477.
91Chien Yen, supra note 50.
92 See id

9 Daniel M. Price, Partner, Sidley Austin LLP, Statement at the Carnegie Endowment
Workshop on Globalization, International Law, and the Future of International Investment
Treaties (July 15, 2005) (summarized by Jennifer Maul and Kate Vyborny),
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/IISD.pdf.
94 MODEL AGREEMENT, supra note 17, art. 8, at 7.
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seemingly accepts the criticism that developing countries are unable to
adequately promote their own interests in investment treaties."
The
Conference, established by the UN, negotiates the provisions of the treaty
with the investor and ensures compliance with the provisions of the
Agreement.96 The host country, however, no longer plays a significant role
in negotiating the treaty provisions that will directly affect it.97
III. DEFENDING THE SYSTEM
In considering a defense of International Investment Agreements, it is
important to pay particular attention to their impact on development.
Developing countries seek FDI in order to promote their economic
development.
In fact, "this is their paramount objective."9
By
participating in HAs, "they have sought to establish a legal framework that
reduces obstacles to FDI, strengthens positive standards of treatment and
ensure the proper functioning of markets, while also assuring foreign
investors a high level of protection for their investments." 99
Hundreds of new bilateral investment treaties have been signed over
the last decade in order to attract foreign investment.100 To accomplish this
goal, the treaties grant broad investment rights to foreign investors and
create flexibility in the resolution of investment disputes.1 The result is a
broad network of rights that investors can employ when difficulties arise.102
This diverse set of rights, though, has occasionally led to divergent findings
on issues of liability. So, undeniably, the process of arbitration has created
some uncertainty about the full meaning of investors' rights.10 3 Therefore,
some reform to promote consistency may be necessary. However, there is a
vast difference between establishing a review method that enhances
consistency and abolishing the system or reforming it to the extent that its
initial purpose of promoting economic development is abandoned.
Despite widespread criticisms, resolving investment disputes with
arbitral tribunals has been an "important factor in fostering foreign
investment, encouraging transfers of capital and know-how exchanges, and
providing a basis for the long-term benefits of investors and sovereigns

9

96

Id. art. 36, at 19-20.
See id.

97 See id.
9 UNCTAD, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: AN OVERVIEW at 87,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IITI3, U.N. Sales No. E.99.II.D.23 (1999).
99 See id.
100 Sauvant, supra note 2, at 6.
101See id.; RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 1, at 27; Franck, supra note 23, at 1523.
102 Franck, supra note 23, at 1523.
103 Jose Alvarez, Implicationfor the Future ofInternationalInvestment Law, in APPEALS

MECHANISM ININTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 29, 30-31 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008).

275

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

30:263 (2010)

alike."1 04 Recently, "investment arbitration has become one of the most
prominent developments in international law."105 The very growth of
international arbitration agreements over the last decade suggests that

arbitration offers advantages to both investors and host states over
litigation. In particular, the current system provides both sides sufficient
autonomy to pursue their interests in a mutually beneficial arrangement.106
Arbitration is by its very nature the result of contract formation and
can be negotiated by parties in many ways.10 7 Parties are "free to select the
place of arbitration, the language of the arbitration, the procedure governing
the arbitration, the number and identity of arbiters constituting the tribunal,
the type of evidence they wish to allow, and so on." 08 Therefore, it would
reduce, rather than strengthen, autonomy to impose a reform that seeks to
create a uniform approach to investment agreements.
There are four areas that have been too easily discarded by critics.
First, the decentralized system currently offers developing countries the
autonomy to encourage foreign investment in a way they see fit. Second,
"[t]here are specific mechanisms in place to address difficulties related to
arbiter bias," '9 which serve as a check on an arbiter's power and authority.
Third, since regulatory takings are as harmful to investors as direct
expropriation, they ought to be compensated, especially since the autonomy
now available allows host states the freedom to negotiate any protections
for policy decisions they might make." 0 Finally, if the Model Agreement is
adopted by developing countries, it may create a disincentive for foreign
investment and thus circumvent one of the very purposes for which the
investment agreement system was created.
A. Vulnerability of Developing Countries
Developing countries seek FDI in order to promote their economic
development and as a result, have entered into investment agreements to
104 Franck, supra note 23, at 1587.
105 Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto
MultilateralAgreement? 34 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 303, 341 (2009).

106 Sherwin, supra note 18, at ch. 19, Part 1.

107 Id; see also R. DOAK BISHOP & MONT P. HOYT, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION:

MEDIATION, CHOICE OF FORUM, AND ARBITRATION CLAUSES (Dec. 2000), available at

www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop2.pdf (arguing that "[tihe foundation of international
arbitration is its consensual nature; thus, to a great extent, the parties can define the manner
in which the arbitral proceedings are conducted").
108 Id.

109 Franck, supra note 23, at 1587.
110 Michael Pryles, Limits to Party Autonomy in Commercial Arbitration, INT'L COUNCIL
OF COMMERCIAL ARB., Apr. 2009, at 2 , available at http://www.arbitration-

icca.org/media/0/12223892171920/damages in-the-international arbitrationpaper.pdf
("When parties draft an arbitration agreement they enjoy broad freedom to construct a
dispute resolution system of their choice.").
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Those countries have accomplished this by
reduce obstacles to FDI.'
providing foreign investors with legal protection for their investments as
well as putting mechanisms in place to assure the proper functioning of
markets. 12 Specifically, investment arbitration agreements promote a
stable environment that is crucial to attracting foreign investors. Arbitration
also provides a faster and less expensive alternative to litigation." 3
In choosing to invest scarce resources, investors "naturally consider
the opportunities, the legal regime and incentives available at various
destinations, and decide on that basis where to invest."ll4 Two recent
signatories to the New York Convention-Brazil (2002) and the United
Arab Emirates (2006)1 "'-are examples of how the current system promotes
economic development. Brazil has become an important factor in global
trade, and the health of the Brazilian economy frequently makes front-page
news." 6 The removal of barriers to investment directly fostered this
development." 7 Although it remains to be seen whether.the Brazilian legal
system will ultimately uphold arbitration awards under the Convention,118
Brazil has been a key destination for foreign investment since it ratified the
Convention."' 9 The "[United Arab Emirates] ... and in particular Dubai, is
also currently attracting significant foreign investment as part of an overall
strategy to move away from an oil-based economy and establish itself as the
commercial centre of the Gulf region." 20
Finally, even when there is a breakdown in the relationship between
n KEY ISSUES, supra note 3, at 54; see also Scholz Testimony, supra note 45.
112 KEY ISSUES, supra note 3, at 54.
113 RUBINS & KINSELLA, supra note 1, at 309-10 (arbitration provides "a reliable, neutral
forum for a foreign investor to obtain remedies ... with the possibility of enforcement across
borders"); see also Sherwin, supra note 18.
114 Nicholas Turner et al., Post-Conflict Countries and Foreign Investment, POLICY
BRIEF, No. 8, 2008, http://www.unu.edu/publications/briefs/policy-briefs/2008/pb8-08.pdf.
115U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, Status: 1958 - Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement
of
Foreign
Arbitral
Awards
(2010),
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html
(last visited Jan. 6, 2009); see also Alexis Mourre, Perspectives of InternationalArbitration
in Latin America, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 597, 603 (2006).

1' Adriana Noemi Pucci, Arbitration in BRAZIL: Foreign Investment and the New
BrazilianApproach to Arbitration, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2005, at 82.
117 Id.

118 See Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar & Jon Schmid, The Rise of International Investment

Arbitrationin Latin America, LATIN AM. LAW & Bus. REPORT, Dec. 2004, at 1, 3, available
at http://www.bg-consulting.com/docs/rise international_arbitration.pdf.
119 See Hans Christiansen & Ayse Bertrand, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.
[OECD], Trends and Recent Developments in Foreign Direct Investment, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT

PERSPECTIVES
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(2005),

available

at

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/62/35032229.pdf.
120 Fernando Peldez-Pier & Yulena Sinchez-Hoet, The Arbitration Review of the
Americas 2008: Venezuela, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2008), available at
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the investor and the host state, it is a mistake to assume that developing
countries are forced to accept unfair provisions and that they are powerless
to protect their own interests. In response to the growing number of
arbitration claims, developing countries have responded in the most
effective way possible: they stopped entering into these agreements and are
threatening to withdraw as signatories to the major arbitration
conventions.121 In other words, they have responded within the market.
The number of international investment agreements also grew at a
slower rate in 2007 compared to previous years, with the "slowdown mostly
attributed to a decline in new bilateral investment treaties (BITs)."' 2
During the first half of 2008, there were eleven new BITs concluded, most
of which involved southeast Asian countries.123 India and Japan signed five
BITs with the least developed countries in Asia.124 The conclusion of a BIT
between Myanmar and Thailand further "confirms the trend of more
intraregional integration among South-East Asian countries in the
framework" of greater regional cooperation.1 25
Latin America has also demonstrated an apparent declining interest in
concluding BITs; in fact, "Latin America was already the least active region
Moreover, three Latin American countries-Bolivia,
in 2007." 26
Venezuela, and Nicaragua-announced their intention to withdraw from the
ICSID amid accusations of favoritism.127 Moreover, there has been a
revival in recent years in several Latin American countries of the Calvo
Doctrine, which requires foreign investors to exhaust local remedies before
This is evidenced "most notably by
invoking arbitration. 2 8
constitutionality challenges in Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela against
BITs and investment arbitration, and Brazil's [Private Public Partnership]
Law prohibiting international arbitration." 29 These cases provide contrary
evidence to the contention that BITs are simply a way for Western countries
and corporations to exploit less sophisticated developing countries. The
actions taken by these three countries demonstrate that they recognize
agreements that are beneficial to their interests and are able to effectively
See Fernando Cabrera Diaz, Ecuador Threatens Cancellationof Oil Contracts Unless
ICSID Nixed As Arbitration Forum, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Aug. 29, 2008,
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2008/08/29/ecuador-threatenscancellation-of-oil-contracts-unless-icsid-nixed-as-arbitration-forum.aspx; see also Damon
Vis-Dunbar, Activists Lobby in Support of Bolivia's Withdrawal From ICSID, INVESTMENT
TREATY NEWS, Jan. 11, 2008, http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/itn janl_2008.pdf.
122 Recent Developments, supra note 6, at 2.
123 Id. at
6.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Mekay, supra note
71.
128 Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 123, 163
(2007).
129 Id.
121
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respond when their interests are no longer being respected.
These trends also suggest that developing countries are choosing not to
enter into harmful agreements, and when they do enter them, they do so
with other regional countries. It is therefore inaccurate to suggest that
developing countries are forced to accept standard provisions dictated by
developed countries. It is also unnecessary to impose a boilerplate
agreement in the mistaken belief that a host country has an insufficient
understanding of its own economic development goals to abandon any
investment arrangement in which it does not receive a benefit. The current
response by developing countries-to reduce their involvement in
disadvantageous agreements-is precisely what should happen when treaty
provisions no longer produce mutual benefits.
B. Bias
Critics also contend that the system is broken because arbiters are
biased in favor of private investors as a result of their self-interest in career
Moreover, critics cite the lack of transparency in
advancement.130
investment arbitration to argue that there is no accountability to correct
incidents of bias.131 These concerns are misplaced.
Bias is not confined to arbiters. Judges are also subject to personal
biases, previous work experience, and subsequent career goals, which
makes a uniform judicial body just as susceptible to self-interested motives.
Therefore, the best solution is to ensure that mechanisms are in place to
control suspected bias. As such, the ICSID (and investment arbitration
agreements in general) currently incorporates rules that allow arbiters to be
removed by either party if there is evidence of suspected bias. 132 For
example, an arbiter may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise
to "justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence."133 Arbiter
bias also presents sufficient grounds for challenging arbitration awards on a
variety of levels by institutions and courts.134
In addition to formal proceedings that protect against arbiter bias,
"professional credibility and word-of-mouth recommendations play a role
in both the appointment and re-appointment of arbiters."l 35 Arbitration
disputes often deal with billions of dollars, which means that "parties will
not accept an arbiter who is likely to be challenged for bias" or one who

VAN HARTEN, supra note 71, at 152-53.
13'Id. at 153.
132 Franck, supra note 23, at
1595.
133 Henri Alvarez, Autonomy of International Arbitration Process, in PERVASIVE
PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 119, 129 (Loukas A. Mistelis & Julian D.M.
Lew eds., 2006).
134 Franck, supra note 23, at 1596-97.
130
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may be incapable of rendering an enforceable award.136 As a result, many
of the arbiters in investment treaty cases have exceptional reputations and
"are distinguished former judges, respected scholars, and practitioners." 37
While the individuals who appoint arbiters may have a "developed-country"
bias, the arbiters themselves can be held accountable for inappropriate
conduct.138 These factors minimize the risk of bias and suggest that
international investment arbiters are legitimate decision makers who can
dispense justice through the current system of dispute resolution.
C. Expropriation
Regulatory expropriation occurs when a government's regulatory
action deprives a person of property rights. 39 Previously, the primary
concern for investors was outright expropriation, but now the "greater
contemporary risk to foreign investors is government interference that does
not formally transfer title away from the investor, but damages or destroys
40
his ability to control or benefit from the investment he has made."
Therefore, government measures that eliminate all of an investment's value
may still constitute an expropriation that requires compensation.141
The influential Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States takes the view that, for the purpose of determining
whether there has been an expropriation, international law draws a similar
line to that drawn in U.S. jurisprudence.142 Consequently, as Justice
Holmes aptly stated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."'" A country should be able to regulate its
economy for the benefit of its citizenry, but when it has previously agreed
to provide just compensation for any action that deprives an investor of his
or her investment, redress should be made.
There is no question that developing countries face a unique problem.
Foreign investment brings increased opportunities and economic
development. However, as these countries become more sophisticated, they
necessarily alter their infrastructure and risk jeopardizing investors'
investments.145 Developing countries, therefore, should "ensure that they
136Id. at 1597.
I37 Id.
138Id. at 1598.
139RuBINs & KINSELLA, supra note 1, at 6.

140

at 11.

141id.
142 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

712 (1987).
143 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
4 Id. at 415.
145 UNCTAD, supra note 68, at 5-6.
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have sufficient capacity to analyze the sco e of obligations into which they
are entering when they conclude an IIA."' 6 Further, they ought to improve
their institutional capacities to understand the economic and social
implications of the commitments contained in IIAs into which they enter.147
Critics contend that, "the burden of addressing these challenges is
likely to weigh disproportionately on developing countries . . . because they
often lack the human and financial resources needed to implement
agreements."l48 However, this argument fails to acknowledge or account
for the fact that decisions "to create and embrace this system [of
International Investment Agreements], and to reciprocally submit to the
authority of private arbitrators, are themselves sovereign decisions., 1 49
Additionally, mandating that a single entity such as the United Nations be
responsible for negotiating on behalf of a developing country's interests is
paternalistic and, ironically enough, infringes on the host country's
sovereignty far more than the current dispute resolution procedures now in
place.
D. Model Investment Agreement for Sustainable Development
Developing countries trying to attract FDI that heed critics and
implement the Model Agreement risk losing significant investment
opportunities because of the strenuous requirements imposed on foreign
investors. Although provisions related to "addressing corruption, and
improving transparency" in arbitration hearings are laudable, 5 o the Model
Agreement primarily concerns itself with paternalistic protections of
developing countries that, by reducing their autonomy, will actually remove
the incentives that encouraged foreign investment in the first place.
The Model Agreement would usher in a return to the previously
unworkable investment environment in three major ways. First, it relies on
an overstated argument that developing countries need policy space and
seeks to maintain this space by restricting causes of action for investors.1
Second, the Conference of the Parties created by the Agreement prevents
developing countries from making decisions about what they deem to be in
their best interests. 5 2 Third, it requires investors to exhaust all domestic
means of dispute resolution before pursuing arbitration through the
Conference of the Parties.'53
The Model Agreement would restrict the definition of expropriation
Id. at 6.
id
148 Id.; see Somarajah,supra note 14, at 41.
149 Meyers, supra note 23, at 74.
146
147
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under the guise that developing countries need greater "policy space."15 4
As mentioned above, however, expropriation appropriately includes
regulatory action that renders an investment essentially worthless. 5 Under
the Agreement, if a country "expropriates property through a series of
regulations and states that the regulations are for the public good," no
compensation is required.' 56 The very nature of expropriation, though, is to
promote the public good.'17 Simply because an action is designed to
enhance the public good should not "relieve the host government of the
obligation to provide fair market compensation." 5 8 This provision in the
Agreement creates the same uncertainty that persisted prior to the creation
of the current system of investment agreements, and thus reduces the
incentive to invest in a host country. Investors will be more cautious about
their investments if they could lose them without compensation in the face
of heavy regulations.
The part of the Model Agreement that establishes the Conference of
the Parties is the most radical departure from the current system of
investment agreements.15 9 The Conference assumes full control over
investment relationships and in so doing completely replaces the current
autonomy afforded to the parties of investment agreements. 6 o The
Conference would not just have the power to perform the tasks assigned to
it by the Model Agreement but also any "additional tasks as it deems
appropriate for the fulfillment of the purposes of the Agreement."' 6'
Additionally, the Model Agreement imposes obligations on BIT
signatories that are inconsistent with the purpose of entering the investment
agreement in the first place.

For example, "all parties shall have .. . a

domestic environmental impact assessment law and social impact
assessment law that meets the minimum standards adopted by the
Conference of the Parties on these matters."' 6 2 This additional requirement
attempts to achieve too much. It goes beyond the needs of the signatories
and has nothing to do with investment promotion.
One of the primary reasons investors prefer arbitration to litigation in
the host country is the overwhelming evidence that domestic courts are
unfavorable to investors' interests.'63 The Model Agreement further risks
154
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creating disincentives to invest because it requires foreign investors to
exhaust all domestic means for dispute resolution before pursuing
arbitration.1" This is problematic because the domestic judicial system in
many developing countries is "corrupt, inefficient, and/or inexperienced."l' 6 5
Arbitration alleviates the risk of these unknown factors in foreign courts,
which in turn creates a favorable environment for investment and serves the
purpose of all parties involved.
IV. CONCLUSION
This comment does not offer a specific approach to reform. The goal
of this comment is to suggest that overly zealous criticisms and reform
proposals to current investment dispute resolution arrangements should be
viewed with skepticism. The current system may need reform. Any system
necessarily must change with time and experience. However, the need for
such improvements is not so great that without them, the system should be
discarded. Critics incorrectly assume that developing countries are unable
to filly protect their own interests when they negotiate investment
agreements. This assumption ignores the reality of how developing
countries have reacted in recent years: rejecting unfavorable treaties and
entering into agreements with other regional powers that specifically
promote their interests. More credence should be given to the realities of
the market before expansive reforms are implemented.
Critics contend that despite demonstrated advantages for both parties
to BITs, the system is broken and needs significant overhaul. First, there is
a belief that developing countries are falling prey to unscrupulous investors
because western, developed countries force developing countries to submit
to unfavorable investment agreements.
Second, critics contend that
arbitration tribunals are biased against the interests of the developing world
in favor of investors' rights. The UN addressed these concerns by trying to
impose the Model Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development,
which deviates substantially from the current system of investment
agreements.
These criticisms, however, are largely misguided and risk undoing the
advances that developing countries have made in promoting FDI on their
own. Moreover, critics' efforts to overhaul the system are paternalistic and
remove from developing countries the ability to freely negotiate investment
agreements that address their specific needs.
Developing countries have demonstrated that they are more than
capable of protecting their own interests. For example, over the last two
years, the number of investment treaties has declined, developing countries

Vyborny), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/IISD.pdf.
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have increased their bargaining power by threatening to withdraw from
arbitration conventions, and an increasing number of countries entered into
regional agreements that better address the specific needs of the given
region that western companies cannot or do not provide.
Investors respond to incentives. Countries that sought to increase
investment created a system that addressed one of the primary concerns of
foreign investors: instability abroad. Investment arbitration clauses provide
a stable mechanism to resolve investment disputes. Limitations on
sovereignty have undoubtedly occurred. Contrary to the assertions made by
critics, though, this does not mean that host countries must now assume
risks normally borne by investors; rather, it reflects the fact that investors
will not risk their assets to unstable and uncertain investment environments.
This realization led host countries to make concessions for the greater goal
of economic development.
Finally, the Model Agreement is a radical departure from the current
system and will erase the advances made by developing countries and
create a disincentive for investment. The revised addition removes
developing countries' autonomy to negotiate on their own behalf and
substitutes a system that will impose unreasonable obligations on investors
that ultimately provides fewer protections for their investments.
Completely discarding the current system of arbitration agreements
would not merely terminate an institution designed to protect those with the
resources and wherewithal to invest abroad. It would also terminate a
catalyst for economic development and all of the benefits associated
therewith.
The lack of protections for foreign investors would mean less
investment, which would impede economic development. This result
would effectively destroy the entire purpose of entering into investment
agreements in the first place. Any proposed reform, therefore, must
consider unintended consequences; thus far, critics' proposed reforms
ignore them.

284

